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Teri Caraway and Michele Ford 
Abstract 
Under what conditions do trade unions in divided labour movements cooperate? Does 
cooperation in one domain increase the likelihood of cooperation in the other? Do institutions 
facilitate or discourage cooperation? We explore these questions through an examination of 
collective action across federation and confederation lines in post-Suharto Indonesia. Using a 
comparison of union cooperation in the policy and electoral domains, we demonstrate that 
tripartite wage-setting institutions have played a central role in facilitating collective action in 
the policy domain, encouraging unions to look beyond shop-level issues to policy issues 
identified by their respective national organizations as affecting workers. The relative 
absence of collective action across organizational divides in the electoral domain, meanwhile, 
can be explained by the institutional context, which creates higher barriers to unions working 
together. 
Introduction 
Despite the harsh global environment and a history of authoritarianism, Indonesia’s unions 
have become increasingly prominent on the national scene since the fall of the New Order 
dictatorship (1967–1998). Organizing a tiny fraction of the workforce, fragmented into many 
competing federations and lacking political allies, the increasing prominence and 
effectiveness of Indonesia’s unions is surprising. One reason for their unanticipated 
achievements is that they have developed an impressive mobilizational capacity and on many 
occasions collaborated across deep organizational divisions. This cooperation among unions 
has helped labour to secure among the strongest legal protections for workers in the region, 
block efforts to pass more flexible labour laws, win huge increases in local minimum wages 
and press for the passage of a new social security law. Collaboration has, however, been 
confined largely to shared policy goals. Unions have been far less successful in working 
together in the electoral domain, where efforts to establish a labour-based party and place 
candidates in local and national office have yielded minimal results. 
In this article, we examine an understudied aspect of labour’s collective action: cooperation 
among unions in divided labour movements. We explore this issue through an analysis of the 
labour movement in post-Suharto Indonesia, asking why unions have been successful in 
building associational power through cooperation across organizational lines in the policy 
domain but not in the electoral domain. We contend that the reason for the variation in 
collaboration across these domains is that unions face different institutional and strategic 
constraints in each. This variation in outcomes suggests, moreover, that associational power 
in one domain does not translate easily into another (Lawrence, 2014), and that institutions 
can facilitate cooperation among unions in divided labour movements (Chun, 2009; Wright, 
2000). We develop this argument in a series of steps. We first discuss how institutions can 
facilitate cooperation among unions in divided labour movements and provide an overview of 
the data that we utilize in this analysis. We then proceed to an examination of collective 
action among unions in the policy and electoral domains. We conclude with some reflections 
on the double-edged nature of institutions and on recent institutional transformations that 
present a serious challenge to Indonesia’s labour movement. 
The theoretical terrain 
Cooperation across organizational lines is a vital but overlooked aspect of working-class 
collective action. Union competition is a common explanatory variable in many comparative 
studies (e.g. Murillo, 2001; Robertson, 2004), but comparativists have not focused their 
attention on the conditions under which divided labour movements set aside their deep 
divisions to work collaboratively.1 For example, Frege and Kelly’s (2004) important study of 
varieties of unionism discusses a multitude of strategies for labour revitalization, but 
strengthening cooperation among unions is not one of them. Moreover, explicit analyses of 
cooperation across organizational lines typically focus on building coalitions with other 
community organizations (e.g. Fine, 2006; Seidman, 1994; Waterman, 1993) or with unions 
or groups of workers abroad (Anner, 2011; Armbruster-Sandoval, 2004; Bronfenbrenner, 
2007; Gordon and Turner, 2000; Kay, 2011; McCallum, 2013; Moody, 1997; Munck, 2000; 
Nissen, 2002). 
The relative neglect of the study of union cooperation in countries with divided labour 
movements is puzzling, since deep divisions among unions exist in many countries. In 
countries with divided labour movements, unions often compete with each other for members 
and political influence. In addition to the organizational challenges of recruitment and 
mobilization, then, unions must decide whether or not to cooperate across federation and 
confederation lines. Failure to bridge these divides hampers their ability to achieve shared 
goals and facilitates efforts to weaken the labour movement through divide and rule tactics. 
As Sil’s analysis in this special issue illustrates, Poland’s labour movement failed in its 
efforts to resist flexibilizing reforms in part because its two largest unions, each linked to a 
different political party, chose not to cooperate. By contrast, Indonesia’s unions, despite 
organizing a much smaller share of the workforce, being far more fragmented, and having no 
strong links to political parties, thwarted flexibilizing reforms because they acted in concert. 
The problem of generating collective action across organizational divides in the labour 
movement does not correspond well to the classic collective action problem in which free 
riding is the primary obstacle to achieving shared goals (Olson, 1971). Even divided labour 
movements typically involve a relatively small number of organizations, which should 
facilitate collective action. The difficulty of bridging organizational divides despite shared 
interests, then, is puzzling when analysed through the lens of the classic collective action 
dilemma. But it is less puzzling if we consider that unions may take different ideological 
positions, often have rancorous histories that produce both antipathy and mistrust, and in 
many cases compete with each other for members and influence. Under what conditions, 
then, does cooperation across organizational lines occur, and what role do institutions play in 
promoting or discouraging cooperation? 
Institutions can provide a framework or architecture for cooperation, create incentives for 
participation and potentially resolve certain coordination problems.2 Institutions can also 
distribute power, but the way they do so cannot be read off the formal institutional structures 
and depends on the context in which they are embedded. In the policy domain, corporatist 
structures have been perhaps the most common institutional mechanism for unifying labour 
organizations. However, corporatist structures do not bridge divides among diverse 
organizations so much as they recognize one peak federation (or confederation) that bargains 
on behalf of all workers (Schmitter, 1974; Stepan, 1978). In cases of societal corporatism, the 
recognized organization may represent the vast majority of workers. In cases of state 
corporatism, the state typically structures the labour movement with the intent of mobilizing 
it (inclusionary state corporatism) or demobilizing it (exclusionary state corporatism) (Collier 
and Collier, 1977) – the latter being the case in Suharto’s Indonesia (Ford, 2009; Hadiz, 
1997). In democratic countries with divided labour movements, freedom of association and 
more pluralistic politics make the construction of the organizational monopolies of highly 
centralized corporatist institutions less tenable. In contexts where centralized peak 
organizations do not exist, ‘liberal corporatist’ tripartite institutions can bring diverse unions 
together to formulate policy (Royo, 2002). By creating a structure that both encourages 
cooperation and that focuses the energy of disparate organizations on a shared goal, tripartite 
institutions can thus serve as focal points that make cooperative outcomes more likely 
(Keohane and Martin, 1995; Schelling, 1960; Steinmo, 2001). 
Tripartite institutions are not created equal. Tripartite committees with little authority to 
formulate policy that merely rubber stamp decisions made by others – or that governments 
consult and then disregard – may foster temporary cooperation among divided unions. Ost 
(2000), for example, has described Eastern Europe’s tripartite institutions as ‘illusory 
corporatism’ because they have rubber stamped and legitimated neoliberal policies. However, 
these kinds of institutions are unlikely to create the kind of sustained cooperation evident in 
Indonesia; in fact, they may even deepen divisions because the unions that boycott these 
enfeebled committees criticize those that choose to participate. Tripartite committees that 
have significant authority are much more likely to generate sustained cooperation, 
particularly where they are permanent bodies that meet regularly. Ad hoc commissions 
created to deal with an economic crisis, for example, may facilitate temporary cooperation, 
but unions tend to go their separate ways once the work is completed. By contrast, 
Indonesia’s authoritative tripartite institutions at the local level gave unions significant 
influence on a matter of deep concern to their membership – local minimum wages – and met 
annually to negotiate them, encouraging unions to cultivate habits of cooperation that carried 
over into other policy areas. In other words, the more institutionalized the tripartite 
committees are, the more likely they are to foster enduring cooperation in the policy domain. 
However, the institutions that create incentives for unions to cooperate on policy matters do 
not necessarily translate into cooperation in the electoral domain. Unions in divided labour 
movements might cooperate on tripartite committees but go their separate ways come 
election time. Political parties are of course the primary vehicle through which unions engage 
in the electoral process. A strong party of the left can coordinate across labour’s 
organizational divides in both the electoral and policy domains, and thus play a role in uniting 
a divided labour movement. Indeed, the importance of strong left parties for advancing 
labour’s agenda is a defining feature of power resource theory (Korpi, 1983; Stephens, 1986). 
In the absence of a strong, unifying party of the left, however, unions have no obvious 
partisan home. In these cases, there are two modal outcomes. One is that different unions 
have ties to different political parties. In these cases, the histories of the various unions are 
usually deeply intertwined with a specific political party. This pattern is evident in many 
countries, including India (Gillan and Lambert, 2013; Teitelbaum, 2010), Italy (Locke, 1992), 
Poland (Ost, 2015), Portugal (Royo, 2002), Spain (Burgess, 2004; Royo, 2002), Taiwan (Lee, 
2015) and Venezuela (Burgess, 2004; Murillo, 2001). It was also evident in Indonesia in the 
1950s and early 1960s (Tedjasukmana, 1958), before Suharto severed these ties in the 1970s. 
Another is that unions are politically independent and have no strong partisan links. 
Contemporary Indonesia fits this second pattern, as do the Philippines (Hutchison, 2015), 
Malaysia (Crinis and Pasasuraman, 2016), East Timor (Ford, 2016) and, for many years, 
Thailand (Brown, 2007). In both of these scenarios, the institutional context reinforces 
divisions among unions. 
Figure 1 synthesizes and summarizes our theoretical expectations about cooperation in 
divided labour movements in the electoral and policy domains. In cases where tripartite 
institutions are weak and there is no left party or unions are linked to different parties, we 
expect minimal cooperation in both domains. Conversely, we expect the most robust 
cooperation to take place where there are strong tripartite institutions and a unifying left 
party. In these cases, we should expect significant cooperation in both domains. Where 
tripartite institutions are strong, but there is no left party or unions are divided in their 
political allegiances, we expect more extensive policy cooperation and little if any 
cooperation in the electoral domain. When tripartite institutions are weak, but there is a 
unifying left party, we expect to find cooperation in both domains since the unifying left 
party can pursue labour’s policy objectives in the legislature. However, if this left party does 
not have substantial representation in the legislature, policy cooperation may be less robust 
than in cases where tripartite institutions are strong.3 
Mapping unions’ collective action: data and sources 
Our analysis of collaboration, or lack thereof, between unions in the policy and electoral 
domains in Indonesia draws on research conducted between 2012 and 2016 in the capital, 
Jakarta, and five union-dense localities (see Figure 2). Two of these localities – Bekasi and 
Tangerang – are within Greater Jakarta. The third is Gresik, which is located in East Java 
near Surabaya, Indonesia’s second largest city, and the fourth, Deli Serdang, in North 
Sumatra on the outskirts of Medan, Indonesia’s third largest city. The final location is the 
island of Batam, a free trade zone located off the east coast of Sumatra just south of 
Singapore and Malaysia.  
 
Figure 1. Cooperation in divided labour movements 
 
Figure 2. Field sites in Indonesia 
All five localities are characterized by high concentrations of secondary industry, but differ in 
terms of both their industrial profile and their political characteristics and history of trade 
unionism. 
In each locality, we engaged in observational fieldwork, attending union meetings and other 
events and activities including training sessions and discussions with grassroots members, 
where we, as researchers, were given opportunities to raise questions related to our research. 
Our findings were recorded in fieldwork diaries and cross-checked against documentary 
sources including government reports and newspaper articles. We also conducted a total of 
185 semi-structured interviews with union leaders and politicians. The primary foci of 
interviews were unions’ political strategies and behaviour during local and national electoral 
campaigns, minimum wage negotiations, and protests, although information was also 
gathered on other aspects of unions’ operations. These qualitative data were supplemented by 
data collected through surveys (N = 1200) of workers on their behaviour as voters, which 
were conducted in Tangerang and Bekasi after the 2009 and 2014 elections. Of the workers 
surveyed, 50% were members of a union that ran at least one candidate in an electoral race in 
that district; 25% were members of other unions; and 25% who did not belong to a union. 
Snowballing methods were used within worker communities to reach the targeted number of 
respondents in each category, and each respondent was interviewed by a surveyor. The 
iteration of the survey run after the 2009 elections contained 89 questions pertaining to voting 
behaviour, the political role of unions, and socio-economic background. The iteration run 
after the 2014 elections, which contained a total of 95 questions, excluded a small number of 
questions specific to technical aspects of the 2009 presidential elections and included 
additional questions regarding voting behaviour at the local level in legislative and executive 
elections. 
Union cooperation in the policy domain 
Scattered across several different confederations, dozens of competing federations and 
thousands of unaffiliated enterprise unions, Indonesia’s unions are a distant cry from the 
encompassing labour organizations that have been the focus of much scholarly work on 
labour movements in advanced democracies. In 2010, the government recorded 
approximately 3.4 million unionized workers, which is about 2.8% of the total workforce and 
8.3% of the waged and salaried workforce.4 About 70% of these 3.4 million union members 
belonged to federations that were affiliated to one of four national confederations. The largest 
confederation is the Confederation of Indonesian Workers (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja 
Indonesia (KSPI)), the internationally backed confederation formed early on in the 
democratic transition by breakaway factions of the former state-backed unions. The other 
major confederation is the former state-backed union federation, now known as the 
Confederation of All-Indonesia Workers’ Unions (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh 
Indonesia (KSPSI)). In addition, the Confederation of Indonesian Prosperous Labour Unions 
(Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (KSBSI)) and the Confederation of the 
Alliance of Indonesian Labour Unions (Konfederasi Aliansi Serikat Buruh Indonesia 
(KASBI)) have high profiles but limited memberships. KSBSI was established during the late 
Suharto years as an independent union, and since the early transition years has stagnated. 
KASBI, which brings together dozens of independent unions from around the country, many 
with connections to labour non-governmental organizations (NGOs), is Indonesia’s youngest 
and most radical confederation. Many other federations and thousands of independent 
enterprise unions are unaffiliated to a confederation. 
Despite these organizational divisions, the mobilizational capacity of Indonesia’s unions has 
been impressive, and their ability to turn out massive numbers in the streets has arguably 
strengthened over time. In the early post-Suharto years, unions worked together to oppose 
changes to Ministerial Decision No. 150/2000 on Employment Termination, which provided 
for more generous severance payments to workers, forcing the government to revoke the 
amendments in June 2001 (Caraway, 2004; Ford, 2004). The following year, unions once 
again united in opposition to Law No. 13/2003 on Manpower, beating back many provisions 
perceived to be anti-worker (Caraway, 2004), and in 2005–2006 unions poured into the 
streets to prevent the government from rolling back some of its provisions (Caraway and 
Ford, 2014; Juliawan, 2011). Unions have also mounted large protests to derail plans to raise 
fuel prices, to push for the passage of Law No. 24/2011 on Social Security Providers, to 
oppose outsourcing and low wages, and to reject changes to the procedures for setting 
minimum wages. Every May Day, tens of thousands of workers turn out to celebrate their 
collective power and to articulate their organizing priorities for the year. At the local level, 
unions in industrial areas have negotiated large real increases in the minimum wage as well 
(Caraway et al., 2015a, 2015b). 
The capacity to turn out members in large numbers across organizational lines has been key 
to these successes in the policy domain. But how have unions overcome divisions to 
cooperate on matters of shared concern? Unions’ willingness and ability to flex their 
collective action muscle is a product of the institutional setting, most notably the influential 
role of tripartite institutions at the local level, which created strong incentives for unions to 
work together. The most important of Indonesia’s tripartite committees deal with minimum 
wages.5 The legal framework for setting provincial minimum wages was established in the 
mid-1970s, but it was not until the 1990s that minimum wage negotiations became a regular 
feature of labour relations, largely in response to a massive wave of strikes (Kammen, 1997; 
Manning, 1998). During the Suharto period, all seats on these tripartite bodies were occupied 
by the state-sanctioned union, the Federation of All-Indonesia Workers’ Unions (Federasi 
Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (FSPSI)) (Ford, 1999; Hadiz, 1997). FSPSI initially 
continued to dominate the various tripartite bodies after democratization, but the new unions 
demanded, and eventually received, a seat at the table. 
The processes embedded in the wage committees also changed. During the Suharto period, 
the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration set provincial wages after receiving 
recommendations from governors, who in turn received input from provincial tripartite 
committees (SMERU, 2001). A process of decentralization, which accompanied 
democratization, saw the devolution of minimum wage negotiations to the district and 
municipality level (SMERU, 2001; Tjandra et al., 2007), where tripartite wage councils set 
minimum wages annually, subject to approval by the mayor or regent and then by the 
provincial governor. These yearly negotiations played a more important role than collective 
bargaining in setting wages (International Labour Office, 2015; World Bank, 2010), and were 
therefore the central focus of union cooperation and mobilization at the local level. 
Although the local wage councils provided a framework for cooperation, it took some years 
for unions to win substantial wage increases for workers. For about a decade, average 
minimum wage increases in Indonesia tracked inflation very closely and remained below the 
minimum decent standard of living threshold (Caraway et al., 2015a). One reason for this is 
that labour representatives on the committees were not always vigorous advocates for 
workers. In Batam, for example, the KSPSI officials who initially dominated labour 
representation on the wage council signed a three-year deal to limit annual wage increases to 
2.5%, which meant that workers suffered real wage cuts during this period. In Surabaya, 
KSPSI representatives were rumoured to have accepted bribes in exchange for agreeing to 
small wage increases. Since minimum wage negotiations directly affected union members, 
low wage increases generated discontent, and activists in KSPSI and other unions began to 
demand expanded representation and more accountability from labour representatives on the 
wage councils (Dhamayanti, 2012). Once new blood invigorated the minimum wage 
councils, they became the most important venue for inter-union collaboration. 
The structure of the tripartite committee encouraged unions to coordinate on strategy and 
tactics prior to the annual round of negotiations. Employers were unified in a single 
association, and they typically put forward the lowest wage proposal while unions typically 
wanted larger increases, positioning government representatives as a pivot. Unions increased 
their chances of convincing government representatives to side with them if they presented a 
united front. These efforts to coordinate sometimes failed. Disagreements among unions were 
rooted primarily in different strategic assessments of how far the government representatives 
would bend to accommodate union demands. In the rare instances when this happens, unions 
usually put forward two different figures for the next year’s minimum wage, with both 
figures exceeding those proposed by the government and employers. The wage council’s 
final deliberations would then culminate in a walk out by the worker members who advocated 
the highest wage figure. Despite ruffled feathers, all unions would be back at the bargaining 
table the next year, eager to work out a common negotiating position. 
Collaboration among unions on the wage council went beyond establishing a shared position 
at the negotiation table. Unions mobilized members in large-scale demonstrations at key 
points in the negotiations in order to exert pressure on the district head and the government 
representatives on the committee to side with the worker representatives. This annual rite of 
mobilization around minimum wages resulted in the formation of cross-federation and cross-
confederation networks in union-dense localities, the main task of which was to mobilize 
workers for collective protests connected to the wage negotiations.6 These local union 
networks, once created, could be used for other policy goals. For example, in Gresik, unions 
transformed their informal network for union cooperation into a more formal structure, 
known as the Joint Secretariat (Sekretariat Bersama (Sekber)). In addition to cooperating on 
the wage council, the unions in Sekber work together to exert pressure on the district head on 
other matters of importance to them, for example, stronger enforcement of labour law and 
restrictions on outsourcing. Sekber also facilitates mobilization for shared concerns at the 
provincial level, where members engage in joint actions with workers from other industrial 
areas near Surabaya. In the greater Jakarta area, similar local networks help to mobilize 
opposition to or support for joint actions around national issues, turning out thousands of 
workers at strategic sites in the capital city as a means of influencing national political leaders 
on issues ranging from wages and social security to opposing increases in fuel prices. 
Cooperation at the local level therefore strengthened cooperation at the provincial and 
national levels as well. 
In sum, the annual minimum wage negotiations facilitated collective action in two discrete 
ways. First, because local wage councils met regularly and shaped a policy of deep concern 
to unions, they created a framework for cooperation and generated incentives for unions to 
participate. Second, they provided a focus of mobilization for the membership of all unions 
and helped to develop habits of cooperation among them. The wage councils did not erase 
antipathies among unions; rather, unions cooperated on them despite their ill feelings toward 
each other. As we shall see later, without similar levels of institutional support, unions found 
it much more difficult to collaborate in the electoral domain. 
Union cooperation in the electoral domain 
While unions have successfully cooperated in the policy domain, they have failed to replicate 
this success in the electoral domain. One reason for this is that there are no institutions that 
facilitate cooperation among them. A party with a social democratic or left orientation could 
provide an umbrella under which unions could coalesce, but none of Indonesia’s major 
parties have a social democratic or left orientation. The absence of such a party is a 
consequence both of history and of institutions put in place after the fall of Suharto. Regime 
change in the mid-late 1960s resulted in the effective eradication of the left (Kammen and 
McGregor, 2012; Roosa, 2006). Partly as a consequence of this history, the major political 
parties that have competed in elections have been non-programmatic, differentiating 
themselves primarily by whether they are religious or nationalist (Aspinall, 2005; Mietzner, 
2008; Tomsa, 2010; Ufen, 2008). In addition, several parties are dominated by Suharto-era 
elites; indeed, some of the newer parties were established by oligarchs as a means to defend 
their power and wealth (Robison and Hadiz, 2004; Winters, 2014). In fact, thus far, only one 
major party has tried to establish a labour base, and this effort was fleeting. The Prosperous 
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)) cut deals with two major federations to run 
union candidates in union-dense localities in the 2009 national elections, but abandoned this 
strategy in 2014. Another reason parties have not reached out to unions is that the divisions 
among them, and the small share of the labour force that they represent, mean that they 
cannot credibly commit to delivering a substantial labour vote (Caraway et al., 2015a, 
2015b). 
In the absence of a unifying party, unions are in the much tougher position of having to build 
cooperation from the ground up. Given Indonesia’s fragmented popular forces (Aspinall, 
2013), working-class actors are at a disadvantage in establishing political parties. In 
Indonesia’s complex electoral system, with the exception of Aceh, new parties must prove 
that they are national, not local, parties in order to compete in elections (Horowitz, 2013). 
Political parties must therefore establish branches in the majority of Indonesia’s localities 
before they can register.7 Despite this high hurdle, there were a number of efforts to establish 
a labour party soon after democratization. KSBSI established a party in the lead-up to the 
1999 election, which competed under various names in the next three elections. Another, the 
Democratic People’s Party (Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD)), which had links to a small 
leftist union, emerged from the progressive student movement of the late Suharto period. 
Some KSPSI leaders also tried to set up political parties before the 1999 and 2004 elections 
(Caraway and Ford, 2014; Ford, 2005). 
But establishing a new party is only the first step. Once registered, a party must win a certain 
percentage of the popular vote in national legislative elections in order to participate in the 
subsequent election. This percentage has increased over time and is currently 3.5%. For 
newly established parties in a large country with many parties, this is a difficult threshold to 
meet. Not one of the small number of parties with a left or social democratic orientation 
formed since the fall of Suharto has been in a position to participate in successive elections. 
KSBSI’s Labour Party was forced to change its name before each of the 2004 and 2009 
elections, because it had failed to meet the threshold and was subsequently disbanded. A 
similar fate befell the PRD, which having failed to reach the electoral threshold in 1999 was 
frustrated in its attempt to register for the 2004 election under another name. A successor was 
established in January 2007, but ultimately did not contest the 2009 elections (Caraway and 
Ford, 2014). 
The combination of registration and threshold requirements makes it very challenging to 
establish and sustain new parties. However, the question remains as to why none of the 
labour-friendly parties reached the electoral threshold. The answer lies in the fact that the 
various pro-labour parties were not joint projects among unions but were instead tied to 
particular unions or even specific individuals. Their leaders never made a concerted effort to 
involve other unions in the development or management of the party. In the case of the 
parties established by KSBSI and KSPSI cadres, they were perceived to be personal projects 
of the leadership (or a subset of the leadership) rather than a collective project of the union. 
Since the parties were seen as personal or union-specific vehicles, and not as encompassing 
labour parties, support for them was tepid even within KSBSI and KSPSI, and virtually non-
existent in other unions. Instead, unions interested in pursuing a political strategy decided to 
run union cadres as candidates in existing parties. 
Given the fragmentation of Indonesia’s unions, electing more than a handful of union 
candidates would require unions to work with each other to maximize the impact of the union 
vote. Objectively, the strategy most likely to succeed would have been for unions to agree to 
run only one union candidate in each electoral district and then to pool their resources to elect 
these candidates. The question of how to divide up territory is a sensitive one, however, and 
each union would of course want to reserve the most labour-rich districts for their own 
candidates. Local rivalries also make it difficult for unions to cut the sorts of deals that would 
be necessary to maximize the number of labour representatives elected. In the absence of 
institutions that facilitated cooperation, the mistrust among unions used to competing with 
each other for members was difficult to overcome. As a consequence, the results of these 
electoral experiments were predictably disappointing. 
In the 2009 and 2014 elections, candidates from different unions (and sometimes from the 
same union) competed against each other in the same electoral district (Caraway et al., 
2015b; Ford, 2014). The two unions that cut deals with PKS in the 2009 national elections 
dealt separately with the party and did not support each other’s candidates (Caraway et al., 
2015b). In Batam, multiple candidates from two different confederations competed against 
each other in 2009, assuring that none of them would win despite Batam being the most 
densely industrialized locality in Indonesia (Ford, 2014). In 2014, the problem of fishing in 
the same pond persisted. For example, in the industrial districts of Karawang and Bekasi, 
candidates from different unions vied against each other in single electoral districts. Even in 
cases where candidates from different unions were not running against each other in the same 
district, unions did little to help candidates who were not from their union. There were no 
formal agreements for them to support each other’s candidates, and it was very rare for 
unions to grant candidates from other unions access to their membership base, for example, 
by introducing them at factory-level gatherings. Instead, each union marched to its own beat, 
and union candidates had to rely overwhelmingly on their own organizations and personal 
networks. 
Despite this lack of cooperation, a small handful of candidates with union backgrounds did 
win seats. Among the victors in 2014 were two candidates from the Indonesian Metalworkers 
Union (Federasi Serikat Pekerja Metal (FSPMI)) who ran on their union identities for two 
different parties in the local legislative contest in Bekasi District. These candidates won 
because of the size of the membership base in Bekasi and the fact that just one official 
candidate from FSPMI ran in each electoral district they fielded candidates. These two 
candidates drew explicitly on their union background and FSPMI’s organizational resources 
to win. However, most union candidates who succeeded relied more on connections with 
their party or community ties for victory than on union support. A candidate in Tangerang 
district’s local legislative race from KSPSI, for example, did not draw on the confederation’s 
local apparatus, relying instead on community ties and his influential position in the local 
party structure to win his seat. 
Coordination around a single candidate is of course more difficult political work than staging 
street protests around an issue of shared concern in the policy domain. Policy outcomes are 
often public goods shared by all unions, which makes it easier to cooperate than in the 
electoral domain, which has a more zero-sum character given organizational rivalries.8 
However, the absence of an institutional mechanism that facilitates coordination among 
unions in the electoral domain helps to explain its virtual absence. With no pro-labour party 
under which all unions could coalesce, each union marched to the beat of its own drum. The 
occasional victories represent the outer limits of what unions can do in the absence of 
cooperation. The ‘go it alone’ strategy used in Bekasi can yield no more than a handful of 
seats, because there are few areas where a single union has a large enough concentration of 
membership to ensure victory. Such a strategy will not work for national legislative seats, 
where electoral districts are much larger. The success of the KSPSI candidate in Tangerang, 
and others like him, is an example of giving up on the possibility of union engagement in 
politics rather than an example of greater union effectiveness in the electoral domain. 
The most successful example of electoral cooperation among unions across federation and 
confederation lines was not to support a union candidate, but to back a pro-labour candidate, 
Rieke Diah Pitaloka, who ran for the West Java gubernatorial seat in 2013. Rieke, a young 
legislator from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan (PDI-P)), had established a reputation as a fierce advocate for worker rights 
during her first term in the national legislature. From her seat on the parliamentary 
commission responsible for labour affairs, she pushed for worker causes, grilled state 
officials, attended worker rallies, and collaborated with unionists in the campaign for social 
security (Cole and Ford, 2014). When Rieke won the party’s nomination, labour activists 
from many different unions formed a labour support network for her campaign, known as 
Pita Mas, an acronym formed from her name and the name of her running mate, Teten 
Masduki – himself a prominent civil society activist with a long history of engagement with 
labour. Although Rieke narrowly lost the race to the incumbent, she did far better than 
expected and beat the incumbent soundly in the areas where union support was strongest. 
Rieke’s experience provides some insight into how the institutional structure of a widely 
accepted labour party might help unions to bridge the divides among them. Since Rieke was 
not a representative of a specific union but rather was seen as someone who rose above 
organizational divides to advocate for workers’ interests – and since there were no union 
candidates running against her – her gubernatorial candidacy unified workers from disparate 
organizations in the electoral domain in much the same way a labour party would. Rieke’s 
candidacy was a one-time event, but much as institutions can do, her candidacy created a 
focal point that helped to overcome some of the barriers to cooperation, transforming the 
zero-sum nature of union engagement in the electoral domain that pitted one union against 
another to a positive-sum game of unions cooperating to elect pro-labour candidates. 
Conclusion 
In countries with divided labour movements, institutions can play a critical role in bridging 
organizational divides. In Indonesia, the tripartite wage councils at the local level facilitated 
cooperation in achieving collective goals and fostered the development of local and regional 
networks of unions that helped Indonesia’s fragmented labour movement to become 
surprisingly effective in the policy domain. By contrast, without a unifying party, unions have 
worked at cross purposes and been less effective in the electoral domain. 
Although institutions have been critical in facilitating collective action among Indonesia’s 
divided unions, we recognize that they can be double-edged. As Collier and Collier (1979) 
observed many years ago, institutional inducements may increase dependency on the state. In 
his discussion of labour relations institutions in France, Howell (2009) notes that state-backed 
institutions may have brought its fractious unions together, but these institutions also 
disconnected unions from their membership. In Southeast Asia, scholars have argued that 
tripartite institutions serve as carrots to co-opt union leaders and to separate them from their 
base (Brown 2007; Hutchison 2015). Akin to Offe and Wiesenthal’s (1980) insight that 
institutionalization ‘dissociates’ representation from struggle, institutions may paradoxically 
strengthen union leadership by recognizing their authority to represent workers while 
undercutting the long-term power of unions by weakening connections to their membership 
and enervating their mobilizational capacity. In Indonesia, however, local wage councils did 
not have this demobilizing effect. Instead, they provided both an architecture for 
collaboration and reinforced symbiotic ties between members and leaders (Caraway, 2015), 
although it took time to have this effect. 
The transformation of the wage councils also provides an excellent illustration of institutional 
evolution and the danger of confusing the form and the effect of institutions. The effects of 
the wage councils have varied over the decade and a half in which they existed in this form. 
Having first fought to broaden representation on the wage councils, unions then cooperated 
more effectively both at the negotiating table and in the streets. The onset of direct elections 
for local district heads in 2005 also gave unions an additional means through which to 
pressure local executives to side with workers in negotiations (Caraway and Ford, 2014). 
This transformation is analogous to institutional ‘drift’ in which changed environments alter 
how institutions function, in this case shifting the distribution of power in favour of workers 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Indeed, so effective was unions’ use of these mechanisms, the 
national government took action to undercut it. Within a year of taking office, President Joko 
Widodo issued a presidential order eviscerating the wage councils by tying wage increases to 
a formula based on inflation and gross domestic product (GDP) growth (Caraway and Ford, 
2015). This instance of institutional evolution is a form of ‘displacement’ in which new rules 
replace old rules (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), likely making cooperation among unions in 
the policy sphere more difficult to sustain going forward. 
Just as tripartite institutions are double-edged, so too are political parties. Encompassing 
labour or social democratic parties can be essential allies in achieving policies that benefit the 
working class. But partisan loyalties can also lead union leaders to side with party leaders 
against the wishes of their base (Burgess, 2004; Murillo, 2001) or to favour political 
negotiation with their party allies over mobilization in the streets (Lee, 2011; Teitelbaum, 
2010). The rightward drift of many labour-based parties globally reinforces the point that 
‘institutional fixes’ must be coupled with member engagement and mobilization. If they are 
not, these institutions may weaken rather than revitalize the labour movement. What is clear, 
though, is that in the meantime the different party affiliations of union leaders can threaten 
relationships within and between politically active unions. Following the 2014 electoral cycle, 
Indonesia’s three largest confederations began to lay the groundwork to establish a broadly 
based leftist party. This development is evidence of organizational learning as described by 
Schmalz and Thiel in this special issue. It is too early to tell if these efforts will succeed and 
whether they will facilitate increased cooperation among unions, but the early signs are not 
promising. The first step in establishing the party was the formation of a mass organization 
backed by all of the confederations as an incubator for the party, but before long two of the 
confederation leaders had established their own mass organizations. In the electoral domain, 
then, organizational learning continues to crash on the shoals of organizational divisions. 
The Indonesian case suggests that tripartite institutions are more likely to facilitate 
cooperation when they are authoritative and meet regularly to set policy. But our argument is 
not simply ‘If you build them they will come’. Institutions can facilitate cooperation, and we 
would be surprised to find sustained cooperation without tripartite institutions or a unifying 
left party, but there are also instances in which tripartite institutions initiate but do not sustain 
cooperation. In South Korea, for example, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
withdrew from the Tripartite Commission after its membership revolted over an agreement 
that legalized layoffs (Kuruvilla and Liu, 2010). Divisions within unions about the relative 
benefits of tripartite institutions versus disruptive mobilization can provoke backlash against 
participation when militants are dissatisfied with the agreements that are produced through 
cooperation (Baccaro and Lim, 2007). In addition, the nature of the divisions among unions 
may be important since sharp differences in ideology or the industry and occupational 
composition could make cooperation harder. The number of organizations may also matter. 
Bipolarity in the union landscape in which two large unions vie for dominance, as is the case 
in Poland and South Korea, may make cooperation harder than in more fragmented systems 
such as Indonesia’s. The scope and content of negotiations may also matter. In Indonesia, the 
wage councils focused on one policy area in which differences of opinion among unions were 
mostly of degree. Comparisons of divided labour movements in which unions are politically 
independent could help to assess whether our finding that cooperation in the electoral domain 
is more difficult than in the policy domain holds in similarly divided labour movements. For 
example, Indonesia’s experience could be productively compared to other Southeast Asian 
contexts where the labour movement is also divided and does not have strong partisan links. 
Similarly, comparisons of divided labour movements in which unions do have strong links to 
political parties could yield insights into the conditions under which they cooperate in the 
policy domain. 
Given that many countries have divided labour movements, the conditions under which 
unions in these contexts overcome their divisions to work collaboratively are of great 
importance for labour revitalization strategies and are worthy of further scholarly scrutiny. 
The analysis here is primarily a hypothesis generating exercise, and points to several areas of 
productive future research. While we highlight the role of institutions, the case analysis also 
demonstrates that historical legacies and the broader political context also matter. 
Comparative studies of similarly divided labour movements would help to tease out the 
relative importance and/or the interaction of institutions with specific historical legacies and 
political contexts. It could also help to better specify the conditions under which tripartite 
institutions foster cooperation in divided labour movements. 
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Notes 
1 Watson (2015) argues that divisions within the left – among political parties and between parties and unions – 
affects the development of welfare states, but her focus is on the consequences of these divisions rather than 
explaining the propensity for cooperation across these divisions. 
2 Our analysis borrows freely from various strains of institutionalism, combining liberal international relations 
scholars’ idea of institutions as focal points with insights from historical institutionalism, rationalist, and 
constructivist traditions. See Hall and Taylor (1996) and Thelen (1999) for discussions of the intersections and 
tensions among these distinct institutionalisms. 
3 See Sil, this volume, for a discussion of the importance of left party strength in the legislature. 
4 This figure excluded the members of the Indonesian Teacher’s Association (Persatuan Guru Indonesia 
(PGRI)), since PGRI’s members in the government sector – which at that time constituted the vast majority of 
its membership – are yet to be fully recognized as workers. 
5 The other key tripartite institutions were the labour dispute resolution committees, which were established in 
the 1950s and continued to operate until they were replaced in the post-Suharto period by tripartite labour 
courts. See Gallagher (1995), Sinaga (2004) and Hurst (2014). 
6 The most memorable mobilizations took place in the 2011–2012 wage negotiation cycle, when tens of 
thousands of workers rioted in Batam and shut down toll roads in Bekasi and Tangerang (Caraway and Ford, 
2014; Ford, 2013). 
7 The specific requirements have tightened over time. In the 2014 elections, in order to compete parties had to 
have an office in every province and at least 75% of municipalities and districts. In addition, parties had to prove 
that they had a chapter (but not necessarily an office) in at least 50% of sub-districts. 
8 Here there may be some parallels to Ornston and Schulze-Cleven’s (2015) comparison of employer–union 
cooperation in the spheres of production and policy, in which they argue that cooperation is harder in the 
production sphere than in the policy sphere, but once established it is more durable. 
                                                          
